Almost all recent literature on Medicaid and labor supply has used Affordable Care Act (ACA)-induced Medicaid eligibility expansions in various states as natural experiments. Estimated effects on employment and earnings differ widely due to differences in the scope of eligibility expansion across states. Using a Regression Kink Design (RKD) framework, this paper takes a uniquely different approach to the identification of the effect of Medicaid generosity on household income. Both state-level data and March CPS data from 1980-2013 suggest that generous federal funding of state-level Medicaid costs have a modest negative effect on household income. The negative impact of Medicaid generosity on household income is more pronounced at the lower end of the household income distribution and on the income and earnings of female heads.
Introduction
Medicaid is by far the largest means-tested transfer program in the U.S. and has experienced explosive long-term growth in both program expenditure and enrollment ( Figure 1 ).
The program has assumed added significance following recent Affordable Care Act (ACA)-aided expansions. Economists have long argued that a means-tested anti-poverty program such as Medicaid, while improving health outcomes and helping alleviate poverty, can have important behavioral effects that can undermine program effectiveness and offset associated economic gains.
Because Medicaid eligibility is tied to low household income and limited asset ownership, the program generates natural incentives to curb household earnings and savings.
In estimating Medicaid's effect on labor supply and earnings, the recent literature has mostly used ACA-induced Medicaid eligibility expansions in various states as natural experiments. Estimated effects on employment and earnings differ widely due to differences in the scope of eligibility expansions across states. A potential concern regarding state-by-state eligibility experiments is that they may be endogenous to state policy (Gruber, 2000) . Moreover, statespecific experiences may not be broadly applicable at the national level (Buchmullar et al., 2015) .
Drawing upon nationally representative data, this paper uses a plausibly more exogenous measure of Medicaid generosity to estimate the program's effect on labor market outcomes. Leung (2016) recently showed that the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP)-the formulabased federal matching rate for states' Medicaid costs-is highly correlated with states' Medicaid expenditure per enrollee, a key indicator of Medicaid generosity. Building on the evidence in Leung (2016) , this paper takes a uniquely different approach to identifying the effect of Medicaid generosity on household income and makes two contributions. First, utilizing the FMAP as a proxy for Medicaid's generosity, I use the kink in the relationship between FMAP and the assignment variable-state per-capita income relative to the nation -to estimate the effect of Medicaid's generosity on household income and earnings in a Regression Kink Design (RKD) framework (Card et. al., 2012; 2015) . Second, using data from the March CPS from 1980-2013, I estimate Medicaid's impact across different quantiles of household income and earnings.
To be more precise, the FMAP is a kinked function of the assignment variable-the ratio of the 3-year average of the lagged state per-capita personal income to that of the lagged U.S. percapita personal income. For example, the FMAP for 2013 is based on 3-year averages of state and national per-capita personal incomes from 2008, 2009, and 2010 . Thus there is no mechanical reason for a kink in the relationship between current household income and an assignment variable based on a ratio that is multiple years lagged by the time the FMAP becomes effective. This paper is the first to uncover definitive evidence of a kink in the relationship between household income and state per-capita income relative to the nation. It closely aligns with the kink in FMAP as a function of state per-capita income relative to the nation, suggesting a potential link between Medicaid generosity and household income. While the kink location is known, tests for an unknown kink in the relationship between household income and the assignment variable reveals strongest evidence of a kink precisely at the known kink location, with significantly weaker evidence of a kink at other "placebo" kink locations.
Analysis using March supplements of IPUMS-CPS data reveals that increases in FMAPa proxy for Medicaid generosity-significantly lowers household income at the bottom quantiles of the household income distribution-the part of the income distribution that has the highest incidence of Medicaid eligibility. A one percentage point increase in FMAP is associated with a 3-6 percent decline in household income at the 20 th percentile of the household income distribution and 4-11 percent reduction in total income of prime-age single female heads. The RKD estimated effects are small and insignificant for groups typically not affected by Medicaid-for example, upper quantiles of the household income and earnings distribution, and married couples without children. While the magnitudes of RKD estimates at the lower quantiles of household income distribution are sensitive to inclusion of state and year fixed effects and state effects by linear trends, their signs remain remarkably robust.
By estimating Medicaid's effect on household income, the paper addresses an important gap in the previous literature, which has mostly focused on individual labor supply response, as the impact on household income is key to understanding the program's role in alleviating poverty (Ben-Shalom, Moffitt, and Scholz, 2011) . The paper's findings have important policy implications. First, a modest negative effect of Medicaid on household income suggests that ignoring the effect would upwardly bias the program's estimated impact on poverty reduction.
Secondly, contrary to an overwhelming prior evidence of generally small and insignificant income effects on labor supply and earnings, this paper's findings imply a non-trivial income effect on household income from the Medicaid-induced outward shift in the household budget constraint (Figure 2 ).
In addition to a predominantly negative income effect apparent from Figure 2 , two other factors suggest that Medicaid should lower household income. First, Medicaid eligibility may be asset-tested, with significant incentives to reduce saving and wealth accumulation (Hubbard et al, 1999) . 1 Secondly, even in the absence of asset-tests, public assistance programs such as Medicaid tend to discourage precautionary saving. Both would lead to a lower household income through reduced unearned income.
But other factors lead to ambiguous theoretical predictions on the Medicaid-household income relationship that must be resolved empirically. For example, the existence of eligibility thresholds, based on household income, creates opposing labor supply incentives for households just below and above the threshold. Households just above the cutoff would reduce their household income to qualify for Medicaid coverage, those below the threshold should increase the labor supply.
Additionally, public health insurance coverage such as Medicaid should generally lead to better health outcomes, which may improve labor market prospects, earnings, and household income. Furthermore, Medicaid expansions could crowd out private health insurance and potentially generate both a substitution effect-through higher wages on a new job that doesn't provide health insurance-and an income effect-through reduced medical expenditure (Dave et al., 2015; Cutler and Gruber, 1996) . The boost to household income from both of these channels could be partially offset by reduced labor supply among individuals who worked largely to maintain employer-provided health insurance. Finally, as noted in Kaestner et al. (2015) , Medicaid could potentially increase household labor supply due to a stimulative effect on the economy. The paper's unique approach to identification of Medicaid's overall effect on household income comes with some caveats. An important concern is that estimates using household income, rather than individual labor supply responses used in previous research, are subject to biases due to changes in family composition. However, this concern is partially mitigated by controlling for number of children and family size and by restricting the sample to female heads. Finally, FMAP is at best an imperfect proxy for Medicaid generosity and, therefore, estimates may simply represent an aggregate macroeconomic effect of changes in FMAP rather than changes in the Medicaid eligibility.
1 The number of states using assets to determine eligibility for Medicaid has declined sharply over the years.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the recent literature on the labor market effects of Medicaid. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4, the econometric framework and identification. Section 5 reports the results and discusses key findings. Finally, there is a brief conclusion.
The Previous Literature
As documented in comprehensive reviews of Buchmueller et al (2015) and Bitler and Zavodney (2014) , earlier work faced the challenge of disentangling the labor market effects of Using the cross-state variation in Medicaid generosity over time, Yelowitz (1995) found significant effect on employment of female-headed households. Subsequent studies, however, detected small and insignificant effect of Medicaid (Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2005; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001 ). Montgomery and Navin (2000) examined the labor supply behavior of female heads using the March CPS and found that results were sensitive to fixed and random effects specifications.
Recent studies exploited changes in Medicaid eligibility across a handful of individual states-Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Oregon-and found mixed evidence on the estimated impact on employment and earnings. While Garthweight et al (2014) found that loss of Medicaid led to a 63 percent increase in employment in Tennessee, Dague et al (2014) found that Medicaid reduced employment by 5.5 percentage points (12 percent) and lowered quarterly earnings by $300 among Medicaid enrollees in Wisconsin. Dave, et al. (2015) found that the increase in 20 percentage points in Medicaid eligibility among pregnant women and the associated crowd out of private coverage led to 11-13 percent decline in employment among pregnant women and 13-16 percent decline among unmarried pregnant women without a high school degree.
Most other studies found rather insignificant effects of Medicaid on employment and labor supply. Using exogenous variation from the Oregon lottery experiment, Baicker et. al. (2014) found no significant effect of Medicaid coverage on employment or earnings. Leung and Mas (2016) compared childless adults in states expanding Medicaid with those that didn't before and after the ACA and found positive effect on coverage but insignificant effects on employment. Kaestner et al (2015) also studied the impact of ACA Medicaid expansions on health insurance coverage and labor supply of low-educated and low-income adults and found that while Medicaid coverage increased by 50 percent, it had a positive but insignificant effect on work effort. CBO (2014) also predicted a rather small negative effect of ACA-Medicaid expansions on labor supply.
2 Gooptu et. al (2016) found that following the ACA, there were no significant effects of more generous Medicaid eligibility on labor force transitions of employment to unemployment or from full-time to part-time employment for low-income adults. Hamersma and Kim (2009) found that
Medicaid did reduce "job lock" but the impact of most other outcomes were insignificant. More recently, Duggan, Goda, Jackson (2017) also found empirically ambiguous effects of the ACA on labor supply, with increases in labor force participation in areas with higher potential Medicaid enrollment offsetting declines in areas with higher ACA exchange enrollment.
Data and Summary Statistics
Analysis in this paper is primarily based on the March supplements of IPUMS-CPS data (Flood et al. 2017 For year they are calculated based on PCPI in years − 3, − 3, and − 4. The FMAP has remained largely unchanged since its inception and states have no control over it. Therefore it is not subject to the policy or legislative endogeneity that is a potential concern in research using individual state-by-state experiences. As detailed in Mitchell (2016) , there have been some instances when the FMAP has deviated from the formula. For example, the FMAP for DC is set at 70 percent regardless of its relative per capita income. Also, as part of the ACA, the FMAP increased to allow 100 percent reimbursement to states for newly eligible Medicaid enrollees in states that opted for Medicaid expansion under the ACA. The FMAP was also increased in [2003] [2004] to assist states during a slow economic recovery. After the Great Recession, in 2007-09, it was allowed to deviate from the formula and was linked to the state's unemployment rate. There were also temporary adjustments for Alaska, Michigan, and Louisiana (due to Hurricane Katrina).
In addition to Medicaid funding, FMAP is also used for some other relatively has a kink with respect to RPCI at the same place as FMAP. So the estimates in the paper should be interpreted as pertaining to both, the Medicaid and the CHIP programs.
Analysis Sample
The analysis sample consists of data from 1980-1981, 1985-2002, 2005-08, 2012, and 2013. 4 Remaining years are dropped because the traditional FMAP-relative per-capita income relationship underwent significant changes during periods of economic downturn and due to the ACA. For the same reason, data from DC, AK, MN (1986 MN ( -1987 , VT (2006 VT ( -2008 are also excluded from analysis. These sample restrictions are similar to Leung (2016) . The paper has two sets of results for the impact of Medicaid FMAP as a proxy for Medicaid generosity-(1) the impact on household income and earnings quantiles and (2) the effect on single female head of households. Results on household income and earnings quantiles are based on data on household heads aged 19 years or older. The female heads sample is restricted to prime age unmarried female heads of households between 22-60 years of age, where the household head is the only member in the household with positive income. Appendix Table A1 presents the summary statistics for key variables.
Econometric Framework and Identification
The econometric specification is based on the Regression Kink Design (RKD) approach proposed in Card et al. (2012) . In this framework, let the outcome variable be some measure of real income (Y) and suppose there is a suitable proxy for Medicaid Generosity (M). Also suppose M is a deterministic function of an assignment variable R with a known kink in the function ( ) at = 0 . Let = ( , , ) have the following relationship with and :
Then the RKD estimate of the effect of on is given by:
4 These years are the reference years for the income variable-household income and earnings.
As discussed in Card et. al (2012) , the numerator represents the change in slope of the conditional expectation of the outcome variable at the kink point 0 and the denominator contains the deterministic change in slope of the continuous treatment variable , at the kink point = 0 . In the RKD terminology is the continuous treatment variable and is the assignment (or running)
variable. Card et. al (2012) showed that identifies the treatment effect on the treated if the density of the assignment variable ( ) evolves smoothly and the treatment assignment rule is continuous at the kink point. is estimated from the following polynomial regression using observations around a sufficiently close neighborhood of bandwidth (ℎ) around the kink point:
In equation (2), is a dummy for being above the kink point 0 , is the order of the polynomial.
The estimated coefficient on the linear interaction term, 1 , represents the reduced form effect of the running variable on . For a linear polynomial, the estimation collapses to a simple regression of on ( − 0 ) and the interaction term ( − 0 ) × . The coefficient on the linear interaction term 1 is an estimate of the difference in slope of the outcome with respect to at the kink point. The sharp RKD estimate of the impact of the treatment variable on is then obtained by normalizing 1 by the deterministic (and mostly known) change in the slope of the assignment variable at the kink point.
Using the RKD framework, Leung (2016) found that the statutory FMAP, i.e. the federal share of a state's cost of Medicaid services, has a strong positive effect on the state-level Medicaid spending per enrollee, a widely used proxy for Medicaid generosity. 5 In the remainder of the paper,
I use the FMAP as a proxy for Medicaid generosity (M).
���������� ������������ is the assignment variable (R)-henceforth denoted RPCI. Because the kink in the FMAP-RPCI relationship is at RPCI=1.054, − 0 in equation (2) is simply RPCI -1.054. As per usual practice, throughout the estimation I 5 For example see Winkler (1991) .
normalize RPCI to zero at the kink point by using the difference (RPCI -1.054), henceforth denoted .
Due to periodic revisions in RPCI, the assignment variable is observed with error.
Therefore, I estimate a fuzzy RKD that simply involves normalizing 1 by the size of the estimated kink in FMAP-RPCI relationship, i.e., the coefficient from an auxiliary RKD regression of FMAP on a constant, the observed , and × . My estimates should be interpreted as the causal effect of a change in Medicaid generosity-as encapsulated in FMAP-on household income. I estimate the following model in a simple linear RKD framework:
The key identifying assumption is that state-year level unobserved factors ( ( )) are uncorrelated with the location with respect to the kink point of the state in year . As shown in Chetverikov, Larsen, and Palmer (2016) 
Estimation Results

Test of identification assumptions
The validity of the RKD approach relies on the assumption that states should be able to precisely manipulate their RPCI around the location of the kink in FMAP-RPCI relationship. A violation of this key assumption would imply that the kink itself is endogenous and RKD invalid.
This can be informally tested by examining whether the density of RPCI evolves continuously around the kink point. Figure 6 plots the density of RPCI around the kink location and, using the
Mccrary test for the difference between the two densities on either side of the kink, shows that the densities do not differ significantly at the kink point; there is no statistical evidence of manipulation around the kink location (Mccrary, 2008) . This is hardly surprising, as RPCI for state in year is calculated using personal income data from years − 3, − 4, and − 5, that are already multiple years old when RPCI for year is calculated.
While the primary RKD identification remains fundamentally untestable, another informal test is based on the absence of a kinked relationship between the running variable and other covariates, analogous to the test of covariate continuity in RD designs. Evidence of a kinked relationship in variables other than household income would cast doubt on RKD validity in this setting. Table 1 shows that most variables do not have a significant kink at the optimal bandwidth except for age, female share, and the state unemployment rate. The kinks in age and female share, however, are not surprising, as Medicaid eligibility is closely related to age and female headship; the elderly and female heads are among the most likely beneficiaries of Medicaid. Nevertheless, this concern is partly addressed by controlling for age and gender and presenting RKD estimates of the effect of Medicaid generosity on income and earnings by restricting the sample to primeage unmarried female heads of household-a demographic group with a high incidence of Medicaid eligibility.
RKD Estimates of the effect on household income quantiles
Before examining any hard RKD estimates, Figures These estimates are for the MSE-optimal bandwidth selected using procedures in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a) and they are obtained using the "rdrobust" package discussed in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b regressions proposed in Bai and Perron (2003) , Landais (2015) extended this test in the RKD context. 6 The strongest evidence of the kink emerges when RPCI equals 1.054, with the R-square reaching its peak in a close neighborhood of the point where normalized RPCI equals zero.
Robustness
Robustness of RKD estimates is explored in Appendix Table A2 , which for the local linear specification, examines robustness to an expanded set of covariates, including state and year fixed effects, and state by linear time trends. The results in columns (1) and (2) are not exactly the same as those in Table 2 because, unlike Table 2 , fuzzy RKD estimates are obtained using simple twostage least squares (2SLS) and not the "rdrobust" procedure in Calonico et. al. (2014b) . RKD estimates in columns (3), (4), (5) Table A2 suggests that while the sign of the RKD estimates at the lower quantiles of household income distribution are robust to inclusion of a broad set of covariates, their magnitudes are highly sensitive.
RKD Estimates for Prime-Age Single Female Heads
Given that eligibility for Medicaid is closely tied to household income, some demographic groups are likely to be more eligible than others. An important group with high eligibility for Medicaid is that of prime-age single female heads. Using binned scatterplots, Panel A of Figure   13 shows clear visual evidence of a kink in the log real household income-RPCI relationship for female heads. That evidence completely disappears in Panel B of Figure 13 when the same relationship is plotted for a group that is significantly less eligible for Medicaid-married women without children.
To further explore the impact of Medicaid generosity on female heads, I estimate a specification similar to equation (3), but for average total and wage income rather than their quantiles. It takes the following form:
Restricting the sample to prime-age single female heads helps address two concerns. First, the kinks seen previously in two key covariates-female share and age-warrant an examination of RKD estimates when these two variable are held constant. And secondly, household income measures used previously do not account for any potential differences household sizes for stateyear observations around the FMAP kink. I restrict the sample to prime age unmarried female heads of households between 22-60 years of age, where the household head is the only member in the household with a positive income. Figure 14 plots RKD estimates (with their 95 percent confidence intervals) for a range of bandwidths using the linear RKD specification without covariates. Panel A shows that the RKD estimates for log total income are large and significant for the optimal bandwidth. Although the estimates decline sharply at larger bandwidths, they remain precisely estimated and negative.
Almost all of the negative impact on household income operates through wage income, as seen in Panel B of Figure 14 . Given that a large portion of all income for this group would consist of wages, this is not surprising. Indeed, a significant effect on nonwage income for this group would cast doubt on the RKD validity. Numbers reported in Table 4 shows that not to be the case, as the impact for nonwage income is insignificant. For the specification without covariates, Panel A of Table 4 suggests that a percentage point increase in FMAP is associated with a 8.7 percent decline in total income of female heads, and a 4.5 percent decline in wage income. With covariate adjustment in Panel B, estimates decline to 4.3 percent and 2.8 percent for total and wage income, respectively. The effects are substantially larger for the quadratic RKD specification in Table 5 , but somewhat more imprecise. On the whole, Tables 4 and 5 show that Medicaid generosity negatively affects total income of female heads and that effect operates mainly through wage income. Placebo tests shown in Figure 15 further support the evidence of a significant kink in income-RPCI relationship in a close neighborhood of the actual kink in FMAP-RPCI relationship.
Conclusion
Building on recent work in Leung (2016) Test for Manipulation of Running Variable (Mccrary, 2007) Figure 7 Note: The figure shows binned scatter plots of the lower quantiles of the outcome variable (log real household income) calculate using households with heads 19 years or older from March supplements of IPUMS-CPS. Log real household income is plotted against the running variable-RPCI-normalized relative to the kink point of 1.054, with bin width set to 0.04. The figure shows that the slope of lower percentiles of log real household income changes abruptly when RPCI minus 1.054 (on the horizontal axis) exceeds zero. Note: The figure shows binned scatter plots of the upper quantiles of the outcome variable (log real household income) calculate using households with heads 19 years or older from March supplements of IPUMS-CPS. Log real household income is plotted against the running variable-RPCI-normalized relative to the kink point of 1.054, with bin width set to 0.04. The figure shows that the slope of bottom quartile of Log real household income changes abruptly when RPCI minus 1.054 (on the horizontal axis) exceeds zero. The 
